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Note from the Field
The Zimbabwean Human Rights Crisis: A
Collaborative Approach to International
Advocacy
Lorna Davidson and Raj Purohitt
Over the past several years, a serious human rights crisis has
developed in Zimbabwe, where President Robert Mugabe
employs repressive measures to cling to power. Civil society and
human rights groups in Zimbabwe are among those who have
come under attack by the government, and they face an
extremely difficult challenge in bringing about positive change
in the country. This article describes the development of the
current crisis in Zimbabwe, focusing on the problems faced by
local activists and organizations that seek to promote greater
respect for human rights. It further discusses one recent
initiative launched by the U.S.-based organization Human
Rights First, which organized a consultative meeting of regional
civil society groups in August 2003. The article addresses the
role that can and should be played by international civil society
organizations, which must be sensitive to the contextual
dynamics particular to the Zimbabwean crisis and to the region.
If they are to be in any way effective, such organizations must
act in support of local actors and stronger regional networks.
t Lorna Davidson is a Senior Associate in the Human Rights Defenders Program at
Human Rights First in New York, N.Y, and Raj Purohit is the Legislative Director in the
Washington, D.C. Office of Human Rights First. Human Rights First is the new name for the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights as of February 2004. The views expressed herein are
those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Human Rights First.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A major human rights and humanitarian crisis has been developing in
Zimbabwe for the past several years and has reached a critical juncture.
Relative to other trouble-spots in Africa, the nature and dimensions of the
crisis in Zimbabwe are simple. There are no rebel forces fighting for control
of resources or territory, no secessionist movements seeking to break away,
no religious conflicts, and no collapse of state institutions. Rather,
Zimbabwe is a classic case of an authoritarian government clinging to
power and using whatever methods it considers necessary to ensure its
continued survival.
Over the past five decades, a sophisticated language and legal
structure have developed to deal precisely with governments abusing their
people and invoking the protection of state sovereignty to prevent external
criticism or interference. The language of human rights, and the raft of
national, regional and international human rights standards that have been
adopted as law, provide a framework for addressing such abuses of power
and seeking to prevent their repetition.
Yet despite the arsenal of laws, courts, monitoring mechanisms,
regional and international agreements, and institutions wielding a range of
carrots and sticks, nothing has yet moved the Zimbabwean government to
end the violence and repression that it is inflicting upon its people. When it
is accused of violating basic rights, it simply dismisses such allegations as
part of a western neo-colonial conspiracy designed to destabilize the
government and reassert white (British) control. The political opposition is
attacked by the government as a stooge of the West and disgruntled white
farmers, and civil society groups are branded as agents of the opposition
and western organizations. Incredible as these claims appear to the
population of Zimbabwe and to external analysts monitoring the crisis,
they have been remarkably effective in muddying the waters and
preventing condemnation and sanctions at a regional level.
The challenge faced by human rights and civil society groups, both
within Zimbabwe and externally, is therefore a difficult one, despite the
seeming simplicity of the crisis itself. This article sets out that challenge,
describing both the environment within Zimbabwe and the problems faced
by local activists and organizations seeking to promote greater respect for
human rights. Describing in particular one recent initiative launched by the
U.S.-based organization Human Rights First, it further addresses the role
that can and should be played by international civil society organizations,
which must be sensitive to the contextual dynamics particular to the
Zimbabwean crisis and to the region. If they are to be in any way effective,
such organizations must act in support of local actors and stronger regional
networks.
II. THE CREATION OF A CRISIS
Beginning in the early 1960s, a bitter independence struggle was
2004]
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fought in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) by the black majority population,
who had been deprived of their land and subjugated by European settlers
since the late nineteenth century. After the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence of 1965, by which the white minority regime in Rhodesia
sought to break from Britain and ensure their own continuance in power,
even more harsh measures were adopted and a system of racial
segregation was rigorously implemented. Open armed conflict began in
1972, between the Rhodesian forces and Zimbabwean liberation groups,
and over the course of the next seven years 30,000 to 80,000 people were
killed as acts of violence and brutality became widespread throughout the
country.'
Following the negotiation of an end to the conflict and the holding of
elections, Robert Mugabe and his Zanu-PF party came to power in 1980.2
Rather than the backlash against the whites that many had feared, Mugabe
preached reconciliation between the white and black populations.3 The
white commercial farmers, numbering only around 6000 but owning two
thirds of the most productive land in the country, were reassured by this
rhetoric and by the terms that had been written into the new constitution,
protecting their right to hold on to their land for at least ten years. While
the inequality of land ownership remained, in the post-independence
honeymoon period, prospects for Zimbabwe's future looked extremely
promising; its economy was strong, its population highly educated, and its
infrastructure well developed.
One part of Zimbabwe's infrastructure that was retained and
effectively used by its new government was the state security machinery.
The army, police and intelligence forces had broad powers under
emergency regulations that were re-enacted after independence. 4
Moreover, the climate of impunity for state-sponsored violence and
brutality that had prevailed prior to the inception of majority rule was
perpetuated through the passing of amnesty laws and the continued
service of security officers who had been involved in torture, killing, and
disappearances.5
While the lives of most Zimbabweans undoubtedly improved with
independence and the formal dismantling of racial segregation, the new
Zanu-PF government soon proved as ruthless as its predecessor in
1 See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ZIMBABWE: WAGES OF WAR 17 (1986)
[hereinafter WAGES OF WAR].
2 See MARTIN MEREDITH, OUR VOTES, OUR GUNS 14 (2002).
3 At a speech on Apr. 17, 1980, Mugabe stated, "It could never be a correct justification
that because the whites oppressed us yesterday when they had power, the blacks must
oppress them today because they have power. An evil remains an evil whether practised by
white against black or black against white." Id. at 15.
4 See Ronald Weitzer, In Search of Rdgime Security: Zimbabwe Since Independence, 22 J. MOD.
AFR. STUD. 529, 532-33 (1984).
5 See LEGAL RESOURCES FOUNDATION & CATHOLIC COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, 1
BREAKING THE SILENCE, BUILDING TRUE PEACE: A REPORT ON THE DISTURBANCES IN
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quashing dissent. In 1982, a campaign was launched against the Ndebele
population of the Matabeleland region in southern Zimbabwe, ostensibly
to suppress armed dissidents who operated there. Massacres, rapes,
torture, arbitrary detention and destruction of property were carried out by
security forces over several years.6 Local human rights groups have
concluded that half of the adult residents of Matabeleland were tortured in
this period.7
In his determination to make Zimbabwe a one-party state, Robert
Mugabe systematically destroyed or disarmed his opponents, and by 1990
he was without significant challengers. For the next decade, a period of
relative calm prevailed in the country, but popular discontent with the
government was on the rise and new forces for social change emerged.
Academics, the student union and the labor movement became
increasingly critical of corruption, the continued use of repressive
legislation, and the absence of respect for basic political rights.8 In 1997, the
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a large coalition of human rights
organizations, churches, trade unions, women's groups, and others, was
formed on a platform for a new constitution containing greater rights
protections. Subsequently, a new political party, the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC), emerged out of the labor movement, led by
Morgan Tsvangerai.
III. A NEW CENTURY OF ABUSE
The situation in Zimbabwe began to deteriorate rapidly in 2000, a year
that was marked by the defeat of the government in a popular referendum
on the adoption of a new constitution. Among other things, the
constitution that was proposed by a government-appointed commission
would have extended presidential powers. This proposal was rejected by
the Zimbabwean people following an intensive "no" campaign launched
by the NCA and the newly formed MDC. That same year, despite political
violence and widespread manipulation of the electoral process by the
ruling Zanu-PF party, the MDC succeeded in winning fifty-seven out of the
one hundred and twenty popularly elected seats in parliament. Realizing
that his hold over the population was rapidly diminishing and that he
might not be able to cling to power for much longer, President Mugabe
retaliated. He seized on land reform as an emotive issue that could be
manipulated to garner popular support in Zimbabwe and that echoed
favourably throughout Africa.
6 See WAGES OF WAR, supra note 2, at 29-30, 136-37 (noting that in 1983 at least 1500
Ndebele civilians were summarily killed by security forces and thousands more were beaten,
raped and detained; and that in 1984, in addition to further killings, detentions and beatings,
several hundred thousand rural Ndebele citizens were systematically deprived of emergency
drought relief.) See also LEGAL RESOURCES FOUNDATION, supra note 6.
7 See UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, ZIMBABWE AND THE POLITICS OF TORTURE 1
(2002), at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr92.pdf.
8 See Brian Kagoro, The Opposition and Civil Society, in ZIMBABWE'S TURMOIL: PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS 1, 7 (Richard Cornwall ed., 2003).
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There can be no question that the system of land ownership in place in
Zimbabwe at independence was grossly inequitable. It has been estimated
that about 6000 white commercial farmers owned 15.5 million hectares of
land, while 8500 small-scale farmers owned only 1.4 million hectares, and
about 700,000 households of black, communal farmers survived off 16.4
million hectares.9 In addition, the land comprising the communal farms
was generally less suitable for farming than that owned by the large-scale
commercial farmers. The independence constitution negotiated with Great
Britain had restricted land tranfers to those made on a willing buyer-
willing seller basis and paid for in sufficient amount. Thus, for ten years
the land reform process had proceeded slowly, but in a relatively orderly
manner. During the 1990s, there was even less progress in the transfer and
settlement process. However, in 2000, immediately following the
government's defeat in the constitutional referendum, a new "fast-track"
program was launched and between 2000 and the end of 2002, the
government had acquired an estimated eleven million hectares of land
formerly owned by white commercial farmers. This acquisition was
achieved by occupation by groups of "war veterans"10 and other
government-sponsored agents, and was marked by considerable violence
and coercion.
While Mugabe and his government have trumpeted the fast-track land
reform program as the righting of historical injustices and the fulfilment of
liberation for the black majority in Zimbabwe, the reality of the process is
one of disempowerment, loss of livelihood, and corruption. Many of those
allocated small areas of land under the program have been unable to take
up residence and farm the land productively due to lack of resources and
infrastructure, rendering much of this land fallow. As a result, farm
productivity has collapsed and the economy has gone into free-fall. Black
farm workers, who at independence constituted twenty to twenty-five
percent of Zimbabwe's workforce and supported roughly two million men,
women and children, have lost their means of survival. Large numbers of
farm workers and their families were displaced from their homes, and also
lost access to vital resources such as schools, health-care, electricity and
water. Significantly, less than five percent of the black farm-workers were
themselves allocated land under the fast-track program.1 Nevertheless, the
government has managed successfully to exploit the issue of land reform in
order to evade criticism at a sub-regional, regional and even international
level.
The implementation of the fast-track land program was timed
9 See Lloyd M. Sachikonye, The Situation of Commerical Farm Workers After Land Reform in
Zimbabwe (Mar. 2003), at http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/dOO00359/index.php.
10 Members of the black majority population who fought during the liberation struggle
became known as "war veterans" and formed various groups to advance their interests. Some
of these war veterans have been involved in farm occupations and acts of violence, having
been promised land by the Zanu-PF government. Sometimes, however, those referred to as
"war veterans" never in fact participated in the liberation war and are, indeed, too young to
have been involved in the war.
11 See Sachikonye, supra note 10, at 66.
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carefully, in order to gain maximum political advantage in the run up to
the 2002 presidential elections. These elections were held March 9 and 10,
2002, and President Mugabe was promptly declared the winner, with fifty-
four per cent of the vote. However, conditions in the pre-election period
were far from conducive to a fair electoral process, and its conduct was
marked by widespread irregularities, condemned by numerous local and
international independent observers as well as human rights
organizations. 12 The commonwealth observer group that monitored the
elections described a "climate of fear" surrounding the elections, and the
MDC contested the results in the courts. Local human rights groups
documented a significant increase in incidents of political violence,
detentions, and torture in the period leading up to the elections and in the
post-election period.' 3 Zimbabwe was subsequently suspended from the
commonwealth and several countries imposed sanctions targeted at
President Mugabe and his close supporters.
In the months following the election, President Mugabe and his Zanu-
PF party sought to strengthen their grip on power by further attacking the
political opposition in a range of ways and suppressing the voices of all
who dared to criticize the government. Conforming to a pattern begun
much earlier, the government used physical violence and intimidation,
arrest and detention on spurious charges under new legislation, the
prohibition or disruption of public meetings and demonstrations, and
threats and verbal attacks published in the government-controlled press. A
variety of groups and individuals were subjected to this treatment,
including not only opposition leaders and supporters, but also
independent journalists, trade unionists, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), civil society activists, teachers, judges, and lawyers.
Numerous, reliable reports from both local and international human
rights and humanitarian organizations, as well as from foreign
governments, have documented acts of political violence including serious
human rights violations such as torture, physical assault, killings, and rape
in Zimbabwe.14 While the victims and perpetrators of these abuses come
12 See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE: FLAWED ELECTIONS
AND FURTHER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (Mar. 15, 2002), at
www.humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/hrdzimbabwe/hrd zim_1.htm.
13 The Zimbabwean Human Rights NGO Forum noted in January 2002:
As the presidential campaign begins in earnest, of gravest concern are the
16 politically motivated murders that were reported in the month of
January. This figure may be higher as it is possible that other deaths went
unreported. This is the highest number of deaths recorded in any one
month since the first politically motivated murder that was recorded in
March 2000. This confirms the oft-repeated assertion that Zimbabwean
elections are almost always accompanied by gross human rights
violations and loss of life. These human rights violations undoubtedly
build up a climate of fear and terror among theelectorate. It also puts
paid to any suggestions that political violence may be on the decline
when in fact it is increasing at an alarming rate.
See ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM, POLITICAL VIOLENCE REPORT (Jan. 19-31, 2002), at
http://www.hrforumzim.com/monthly/january0202.htm (emphasis removed).
14 A vibrant and committed human rights community has developed in Zimbabwe in the
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from across the political spectrum, as well as from around the country, in
the vast majority of reported cases the victims are members or supporters
of the MDC, or people accused of supporting the MDC. In such cases,
victims and witnesses generally allege that the perpetrators of abuse are
officers from the Zimbabwean police and security forces, or members of
government-supported militias, such as so-called war veterans groups and
youth militias (known as Green Bombers). The climate of impunity that
prevailed from the civil war and through the violence in Matabeleland in
the 1980s continues to protect these perpetrators of serious human rights
violations.
Reporting cases of political violence in Zimbabwe is a difficult and
risky endeavor. Many incidents undoubtedly go undocumented,
particularly in cases of rape and sexual assault, which victims are often
unwilling to report. However, groups such as the Amani Trust and the
Human Rights NGO Forum have been able to compile lengthy reports
based on victim and witness accounts of particular incidents, and have
identified certain patterns and trends. These groups have noted a
significant increase in political violence in the period from 2000 to present,
with peaks showing around local, parliamentary and presidential elections.
In addition, while the number of killings has remained relatively low, there
has been a huge increase in the reported incidents of torture and other
forms of physical mistreatment. The Human Rights NGO Forum reported
1061 documented incidents of torture in 2002, as well as fifty-two assaults,
twenty-nine disappearances, fifty-eight murders and seven rapes.15 From
January I to July 31, 2003, a further 390 incidents of torture were recorded
by the forum, along with 238 assaults, four disappearances, eight murders,
and six rapes.' 6 The methods of physical abuse also demonstrate patterns,
and particular centers such as youth training camps have been identified as
locations where certain types of abuse are common.17
past decade and a remarkable number of civil society groups and NGOs operate in the
country despite the risks that this entails. These groups have been a vital source of
information about the situation in the country. As discussed further below, some
organizations in the region have also played an important role in drawing attention to
deteriorating conditions inside Zimbabwe, in addition to groups in Europe and the United
States.
15 See ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM, POLITICAL VIOLENCE REPORT (Dec. 2002),
at http://www.hrforumzim.com/monthly/dec_02.htm [hereinafter DECEMBER REPORT].
16 See ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM, POLITICAL VIOLENCE REPORT (July 2003), at
http://www.hrforumzim.com/monthly/july03.doc.
17 For example, several disturbing reports were publicized in 2002 and early 2003 of the
use of electrocution and the forcing of detainees to drink urine and other noxious substances,
during detention by the police. One such case was that of human rights lawyer Gabriel
Shumba and MDC Member of Parliament Job Sikhala, who were detained for three days in
nid-January by the police. Following their torture (beating, electric shocks, and being forced
to drink urine), they were hospitalized and subsequently fled the country. In other cases,
individuals and groups describe being severely beaten with sticks, rifles, chains, and other
weapons, in their homes, on the streets, and at places of detention.
Camps have been established ostensibly for the purpose of carrying out the government's
national youth service training program. Numerous reports indicate, however, that these
camps are used to train youth militias and are the sites of significant violence and abuse, both
of the youth themselves, members of the opposition, and individuals perceived to be
[Vol. 7
7
Davidson and Purohit: The Zimbabwean Human Rights Crisis: A Collaborative Approach to International Advocacy
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
Zimbabwean Human Rights Crisis
A public strike called by the MDC in March 2003 generated a strong
public response and many people stayed away from work for two days. At
this time, a notable increase in the number of incidents of torture and
physical abuse was recorded by human rights groups. Common among the
cases recorded were abductions of people from their homes at night,
serious physical mistreatment in homes and in detention, and threats of
further harm should the victims report their attacks. Several cases of sexual
assault were also recorded at this time, and the numbers of such cases are
likely to be significantly higher than actually reported.
Zimbabwe's human rights crisis involves the denial of economic rights
to the vast majority of the population, in addition to the ongoing violations
of civil and political rights. With inflation in 2003 running at an estimated
300 to 500 percent, most families can no longer afford the basic food
required for survival. At the beginning of 2003, the United Nations
estimated that 7.2 million people were at risk of starvation.'8 Despite this
chronic situation, the Zimbabwean government has insisted on the
retention of the state's monopoly on the import of maize and wheat, the
staple grains. Through its Grain Marketing Board, the government is able
to control who among its population is given access to these essential
supplies. Numerous reports indicate that this power is regularly abused to
deny food to communities considered supportive of the MDC.19 The
government also seeks to influence the distribution of food by donor
agencies and has prevented food distribution by non-governmental
organizations and aid agencies in some areas.20
Through corruption, mismanagement, and the disastrous
implementation of the fast-track land reform program, Zimbabwe's
economy, once considered the strongest in Africa, has crumbled, and more
than seventy-five percent of the population lives in poverty.
Unemployment has risen from thirteen percent in 1980 to eighty percent in
2002. Since independence, life expectancy has gone down by over ten
supportive of the opposition. See THE SOLIDARITY PEACE TRUST, National Youth Service Training:
Shaping Youths in a Truly Zimbabwean Manner, An Overview of Youth Militia Training and
Activities in Zimbabwe, October 2000 - August 2003 (2003), at
http://www.kubatana.net/docs/chiyou/youth-militia_030905-pix-sml.pdf.




19 In August 2002, one Zanu-PF official noted that Zimbabwe would be better off with
only six million people (implying that half of the current population should indeed starve to
death), if those six million people were supporters of the liberation struggle (indicating Zanu-
PF supporters). U.S. Dep't of State, Zimbabwe's Man-made Crisis (Feb. 2003), at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/16501.htm (quoting the Foreign Secretary Didymus Mutasa
of Mugabe's ruling ZANU-PF party).
20 For example, in August 2003, the Zimbabwean government released a policy directive
that withdrew responsibility from the World Food Programme for the selection of
beneficiaries and the distribution of food aid, replacing the agency with local government
structures and village authorities. See U.N. Integrated Regional Information Networks,
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years, in part due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Food shortages required the
import of up to 1.3 million metric tons of maize in 2003 to 2004 to prevent
mass starvation.21
The acute food shortage and the control of distribution of aid supplies
by the government and its agents have a particularly detrimental effect on
the large number of displaced farm workers (especially those of foreign
descent), women, the elderly, orphaned children, and people living with
HIV/AIDS. In addition, as noted above, the government's fast-track land
reform program has resulted in the destruction of the infrastructure of
social services in many rural areas, including healthcare and basic
education.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY
Rigorous documentation of human rights violations is the most basic
element of human rights advocacy, necessary to ensure the dissemination
of accurate information and the building of legal cases, and to create
pressure for action domestically and internationally. In Zimbabwe, such
documentation is significantly hampered by the efforts of the authorities,
which in addition to using threats, violence, and intimidation against those
seeking to record human rights abuses, also makes use of new legislation
that significantly restricts the scope for criticism of state institutions and
seeks to prevent civil society and political organizing.
The Public Order and Security Act (POSA), a draconian law adopted in
January 2002 to replace the Rhodesian Law and Order Maintenance Act, is
used routinely by the Zimbabwean police to arrest and detain members of
the opposition and others perceived as supportive of them, such as civil
society activists. The law is also used to prevent and disrupt peaceful
meetings, as it requires police permission to hold any kind of public
gathering. The provisions of POSA are themselves contrary to
constitutional provisions on freedom of expression, association, and
assembly, as well as being in violation of international human rights law. 22
Often, individuals are arrested and detained for several hours, ostensibly
under the authority of POSA. However, in many such cases, no charges are
ever brought and the detention is used simply as a means of intimidation.
In others, baseless charges are filed, and cases are initiated but never
brought to trial, again as a method of harassment and intimidation. 23
21 See U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Famine Early Warning Network, Monthly Food Security
Update (Feb. 27, 2003) at
http:/ /www.reliefwebint/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896fl5dbc852567ae0530132/0e8O3ddeclb4blf
b49256cf60008c703?OpenDocument
22 See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Background Statement on the Public Order and
Security Bill Before the Zimbabwean Parliament (Dec. 19, 2001) at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/hrd-zimbabwe/hrd-zim-6.htm.
23 For example, among those who have been arrested, detained and/or charged on the
basis of POSA are the president and secretary of the Zimbabwe Law Society, a range of trade
union leaders, a group of 350 women National Constitutional Assembly members, and
demonstrators at World Cup cricket matches being played in Zimbabwe. Often those arrested
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The threat of arrest and prosecution under the POSA hangs over all
human rights defenders, whose exposure of government-sponsored
violence and other human rights violations is considered threatening by
Mugabe and his ministers. Even before the enactment of the Act, such
groups and individuals had been subjected to a variety of tactics seeking to
silence them.
Throughout 2001, the government sought to discredit human rights
organizations, such as the Amani Trust, an independent group that
provides assistance to torture victims and exposes the practice of torture in
Zimbabwe. Using government-controlled newspapers, the authorities
accused such groups of supporting neo-colonialism and engaging in
fraudulent activity. In April 2002, the government-controlled newspaper
The Chronicle reported that a war veterans' leader associated with the Zanu-
PF regime had called for the removal of passports from NGO
representatives and said that they should be "punished" for spreading
"anti-Zimbabwe propaganda." The paper also quoted this leader as issuing
a threat that "after the commercial farmers we will move to the NGOs and
remove all employees working against the interests of Zimbabwe." 24
In May 2002, press reports quoted the then Home Affairs Minister,
John Nkomo, as stating that the government was moving to adopt
measures for the deregistration of NGOs engaged in activity that it
considered "anti-Zimbabwe." 25 Another government official reportedly
stated that the government wanted all NGOs operating in Zimbabwe to be
registered so that their activities could be monitored. At the opening of
parliament in July 2003, President Mugabe indicated that the government
would soon introduce a Non-Governmental Organisations Bill, designed
"to ensure that the operations of Non-Governmental Organisations are
consistent with and support Government policies and programmes," and
"to prevent foreign interests from using the NGO structures to subvert our
sovereignty." 26
The Amani Trust has repeatedly been the target of threats and
vilification in the government press. Amani Trust staff have been
threatened, including its medical director Dr. Frances Lovemore, who was
arrested and detained in August 2002. The organization has been accused
of constituting a threat to Zimbabwe's peace and security by Zanu-PF
officials and was singled out in November 2002 as being in contravention
of the restrictive Private Voluntary Organizations Act. Government
representatives stated that the Amani Trust would be dealt with
"strongly," and shortly thereafter, the organization was forced to suspend
its operations due to concerns about the safety of its staff.
and detained are physically abused and sometimes tortured while in custody.
24 Withdraw Passports of Sellouts and ... Ban Anti-Zim NGOs, THE CHRONICLE (ZIMBABWE),
Apr. 18, 2002, at 1 (on file with authors).
25 See NEWS 24 (SOuTH AFRICA), Gov't Threatens to Clamp Down on NGOs, May 12, 2002 (on
file with authors).
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The POSA has also been used along with the Access to Information
and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) to stifle independent reporting by
the press about the situation in Zimbabwe. Journalists in Zimbabwe are
required to register with a largely government-appointed media
commission under the terms of the AIPPA, or face criminal prosecution.
Several provisions of the AIPPA have been challenged in the courts, and on
May 7, 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that an article which criminalized
"publishing falsehoods" violated the constitutional protection of freedom
of expression.
Media workers continue to be threatened, attacked, arrested, and
prosecuted, and foreign journalists have been labeled by the government as
spies and forced to leave the country. Journalists have also been among the
victims of serious physical abuse. The main independent daily newspaper
had its offices attacked on several occasions and was eventually shut down
by the police as it tried to continue publishing without being registered
under the terms of the AIPPA.27 During public strikes held in March and
June 2003, journalists covering the protests were arrested and physically
assaulted, as well as having equipment confiscated.
Moreover, civil society groups and Zimbabwean citizens are unable to
rely upon the courts to vindicate their rights, due to the subversion of the
judiciary by the government in recent years.28 An independent judiciary is
key to ensuring the rule of law in any society, and in Zimbabwe the
judiciary has come under increasing governmental pressure since early
2000. Through general intimidation as well as specific threats, several
senior judges who demonstrated their independence from government
influence have been removed. In early 2001, Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay
was among those forced to step down. In March 2002, another Supreme
Court judge known for his independence, Judge Ahmed Ebrahim, also
announced his resignation, only days after issuing a ruling that declared
President Mugabe's electoral amendments prior to the presidential election
illegal.
Judges and magistrates have also been physically attacked and
arrested. In August 2002, a magistrate in Chipinge was assaulted by a mob
of so-called war veterans after he handed down a ruling in favor of two
Movement for Democratic Change members. In September, former High
Court Justice Fergus Blackie was arrested and detained for several days,
without adequate food, clothing and necessary medication, in apparent
retaliation for an earlier ruling in which he had found the Minister of
27 The Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe, which publishes the independent
newspaper, the Daily News, challenged the constitutionality of the provisions of the AIPPA
requiring registration. However, in September 2003, a court ruled that the ANZ had no
standing to bring a constitutional challenge if it didn't first register with the media
commission. The ANZ then sought to register the Daily News, but its application was denied
by the media commission and police occupied its offices and confiscated equipment. At the
time of writing, the Daily News remained unable to publish.
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Justice in contempt of court. Justice Blackie was charged with violating the
Prevention of Corruption Act, although these charges were dropped in
June 2003, due to lack of evidence.
Lawyers in Zimbabwe who have sought to uphold basic constitutional
and human rights have also been subjected to attack and persecution.
Lawyers are routinely equated with their clients by police forces and are
harassed, threatened, and obstructed, particularly in cases where their
clients are MDC members. Many lawyers report incidents where they have
been denied access to their clients or have been given false or misleading
information by the police in an effort to prevent them from performing
their tasks. Lawyers have also, on occasion, been themselves arrested and
physically abused by police as they have sought to represent their clients.29
Independent trade union representatives working to promote and
protect the basic rights of Zimbabwean workers have also been threatened,
arrested, physically abused, and harassed. Even church leaders who
denounce state-sponsored violence and the economic hardships faced by
the Zimbabwean people are targeted by threats, intimidation, and abuse.
V. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LOCAL ACTIVISTS
In light of these repressive measures, designed to silence local activists
and inhibit the exercise of basic rights, members of civil society groups
inside Zimbabwe have looked abroad for support from their counterparts,
both within the immediate region and more widely, as well as from the
international community as a whole. Faced with a government adept in
transforming any overseas criticism into another example of western
manipulation, the challenge facing non-Zimbabwean and, particularly,
non-African activists is to ensure that whatever approach is taken to the
Zimbabwe crisis is not counter-productive.
Indeed, external groups wishing to take action in support of their
Zimbabwean colleagues have to contend not only with a hostile
Zimbabwean government but sometimes also with dismissal by or hostility
from other governments in the region. President Mugabe has had
remarkable success in retaining the support of key African heads of state
and government, despite the evidence of human rights abuses committed
by his agents and the economic collapse of the country, which has had
serious consequences for neighboring countries. Such support has been
most evident in meetings of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and during the discussion of Zimbabwe's suspension
from the commonwealth. 30 South African President Thabo Mbeki has gone
29 For example, Gabriel Shumba was tortured in January 2003. See DECEMBER REPORT,
supra note 16. And Gugulethu Moyo was assaulted in March 2003. See Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, Advocacy Alerts (an. 17, 2003; Mar. 25, 2003) at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/hrd-zimbabwe/hrdzimbabwe.htm.
30 Zimbabwe was suspended from the commonwealth in March 2002 following the
presidential elections. The question of whether the suspension should be lifted was addressed
by the commonwealth Heads of State and Government at a meeting in Abuja, Nigeria in
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so far as to brand those who raise concerns about human rights in
Zimbabwe as using the issue as a "tool for overthrowing the
government." 31 Such comments significantly increase the risk for human
rights activists inside Zimbabwe, as well as impugning the motives of
those outside the country.
International groups32 concerned with the rapid deterioration of the
rule of law and the consequent increase in human rights violations being
committed in Zimbabwe are faced with a series of choices and critical
questions to consider. For instance, should such. groups engage with the
Zimbabwean government, and is it useful to engage key international
players such as the United States and the European Union? Should they
rely on data being compiled by Zimbabwean civil society groups or is it
necessary to visit Zimbabwe in order to assess the situation independently?
Should groups from overseas even attempt to compel the Zimbabwean
government to refrain from violence by adopting the classic strategy of
shaming the perpetrators?
To a certain extent, either while working in coalition or independently,
several different international organizations have embraced each of these
options. In part this diverse approach is a reflection of the operational
differences of the groups working to stem the ongoing human rights
violations in Zimbabwe.
For groups within Africa, key sticking points have been access to
accurate information about the situation within Zimbabwe, the absence of
sufficient resources to engage in sustained advocacy at a national and
regional level on the Zimbabwe crisis, and in many cases the intransigence
of their governments on the issue of Zimbabwe. Misinformation spread by
the Zimbabwean government and the perception that the country's
problems are based on racially polarized disputes over land have
contributed to confusion and a certain amount of reluctance to become
embroiled in the situation. Nonetheless, in several countries, human rights
groups, trade unions, church leaders, and women's organizations have
expressed great concern about the crisis in Zimbabwe and have sought to
engage with their governments and regional institutions on the issue. 33
Toward the end of 2001, Human Rights First, a U.S.-based non-
governmental organization that works to promote and protect human
rights both domestically and around the world, began to refocus attention
December 2003. The issue threatened to split the commonwealth with countries such as South
Africa, Zambia, and Mozambique arguing in favor of readmission. The decision was finally
taken to continue the suspension and President Mugabe responded immediately by declaring
Zimbabwe's withdrawal from the commonwealth.
31 Thabo Mbeki, We Will Resist the Upside-Down View of Africa, ANC TODAY, Vol. 3, No. 49,
at 12-18 (Dec. 2003), www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2003/at49.htm (internal quotation
omitted).
32 The term "international" is here used to denote non-Zimbabwean organizations rather
than organizations that operate in more than one country.
33 Notable examples are Ditshwanelo (the Botswana Centre for Human Rights), The
Namibian Society for Human Rights, and various human rights, church, and trade union
groups in South Africa.
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on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe. Due to both organizational
constraints and preferred methods of operation, Human Rights First did
not seek to engage in on-the-ground fact gathering at that time. Rather,
staff relied upon reports provided by local sources and other human rights
and humanitarian organizations working within Zimbabwe, and analyzed
and channeled this information in order to attract greater international
attention to the crisis.34 Despite the significant amount of information on
political violence and other rights violations available from Zimbabwean
groups, it became clear during 2002 that there was still a real need to
educate policy-makers, broader civil society actors, and the public around
the world, in order to counter some of the misinformation emanating from
the Zimbabwean government and its allies. As noted above, by smearing
the reputation of local and international NGOs and claiming that groups
such as Amnesty International are stooges of colonial interests, President
Mugabe has had some success in shifting the focus of individuals who may
care deeply about Zimbabwe from the abuses of his government to a macro
policy debate on land, colonial rule and the West's questionable approach
to African affairs.
The importance to human rights advocacy of credible documentation
and effective dissemination cannot be underestimated, and Human Rights
First's efforts to play a greater role in getting the facts to the public on
Zimbabwe became a increasingly central part of its work. Other
international groups, including the International Crisis Group, Amnesty
International, and Physicians for Human Rights, have also recognized the
need for such reporting. The resulting series of high-quality, well
researched reports, coupled with outstanding journalism from the ever-
growing ranks of Zimbabwean and non-Zimbabwean reporters who have
been forced to flee the country, have helped to build the foundation for
subsequent advocacy at national, regional, and transnational levels.
In addition to focusing on the critical need to get the facts out on
Zimbabwe, international groups like Human Rights First have been
required to assist local efforts to facilitate Zimbabwean civil society. By
drawing attention to individual cases where civil society actors are
harassed, threatened, or abused, these efforts afford a measure of
protection to activists, and provide an indicator of the level of severity of
the human rights crisis. The strategies employed to achieve this goal vary,
but have been enhanced in recent years by technological developments that
allow for the dissemination of information and the targeting of key
governments for e-advocacy. Throughout 2002, Human Rights First sought
to highlight cases of individual Zimbabwean activists and NGOs that were
being singled out by the government for their role in exposing human
rights violations, advocating reform or defending the victims of
government violence. 35 In addition, it focused some attention on legislative
34 In channelling information provided by local sources, staff were always mindful of the
security situation for local activists and organizations, and took this into account when
attributing material.
35 See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Advocacy Alerts, at
2004]
14
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 7 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol7/iss1/4
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
developments in Zimbabwe that had, or potentially could have, a negative
impact on the work of local human rights defenders.
In a similar vein, a Zimbabwean civil society initiative was launched in
early 2003, to create a Human Rights Defenders Emergency Fund. This
fund is designed to be supported by international groups concerned to
ensure that local human rights defenders are able to operate in Zimbabwe.
The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and other local groups are
administering the fund, which has been set up to support the "'rapid
reaction' provision of legal services to human rights defenders across
Zimbabwe who have been arrested, detained or otherwise targeted by state
organs or affiliates as a result of their work in the human rights and civil
society sector." 36 The Fund is used to cover emergency legal fees for
lawyers provided to human rights defenders who have been detained or
arrested.
This initiative resembles the approach taken during the struggle
against apartheid in South Africa, whereby the "Defence and Aid in South
Africa" fund (which became the International Defense and Aid Fund for
Southern Africa - IDAF) was formed. The IDAF was a vital instrument in
the fight against apartheid, and its importance was underscored during the
final IDAF meeting in 1991 when Oliver Tambo, the anti-apartheid leader
and former national chairperson of the ANC, said:
Today I cannot but recall many very special and personal
memories of the numerous ways in which the Fund was
able to help our people in their time of need. How many
more of our political prisoners would have been executed?
How many more detainees would have been brutally
tortured? How many families of those detained and
imprisoned would have been destitute, if it had not been
for IDAF? Above all, IDAF stood with us during our
darkest days.37
Assistance from international civil society groups to their Zimbabwean
counterparts cannot, however, be limited to the external dissemination of
information and intermittent attempts to help protect individual human
rights defenders. During a mission to Zimbabwe and South Africa in
February and March 2003, the authors discussed how best a U.S.-based
NGO such as Human Rights First could be supportive of local civil society
actors. This dialogue confirmed our opinion that supporting the advocacy
efforts of the Zimbabwean groups would be counter-productive if it
followed the usual model of western-based organizations, taking the lead
in raising concerns at a governmental and inter-governmental level
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/hrdzimbabwe/hrdzimbabwe.htm.
36 Press Release, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, The Human Rights Defenders
Emergency Fund (Apr. 24, 2003), at
http://www.kubatana.net/htnl/archive/hr/030424zlhr.asp?sector=HR.
37 Oliver Tambo, Speech at the Final Conference of International Defence and Aid Fund
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without genuine collaboration with the affected groups themselves. This
belief was grounded in part on an understanding that: (a) the Zanu-PF
government was successfully dividing the world community by using
"anti neo-imperialism" arguments; and (b) an effective response to this
strategy required pressure for the cessation of human rights violations to
come from Zimbabwe's direct neighbors in Africa and other powerful
African states.
VI. THE AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY CONSULTATION ON ZIMBABWE
Following these discussions in early 2003, Human Rights First
determined that its most effective role in the broader advocacy work
would be to commit to organizing a consultative meeting of African civil
society groups to tackle the Zimbabwe crisis. It was recognized that
important regional civil society actors included representatives of the
Christian churches, trade unions, human rights NGOs, youth groups, and
women's organizations, and that each of these groups should be brought
into the discussions. Crucially, Zimbabwean civil society leaders were the
main proponents of the meeting and felt that the right role for Human
Rights First to play was that of convener, because it had the capacity to
bring together representatives of each of these sectors from several African
countries. While Human Rights First staff were then able to make the
necessary practical arrangements, reach out to the desired participants,
create a structure for the two-day event and outline an agenda for the
discussions, it must be emphasized that at all stages the role of the
organization was one of facilitation, rather than substantive participation.
Such a collaborative approach required the close cooperation and
involvement of all of the participants in the meeting, and particularly that
of a local partner organization in the host country. Recognizing the
practical difficulties of holding the type of meeting planned within
Zimbabwe itself, it was determined that Botswana was the most
appropriate venue, for reasons of accessibility, proximity to Zimbabwe,
infrastructure, and its government's more open position on Zimbabwe.
38
Based in Botswana's capital, Gaborone, DITSHWANELO (the Botswana
Centre for Human Rights) was identified as the preferred local partner
organization, for it had already engaged in advocacy on Zimbabwe and in
efforts to raise awareness about the crisis within Botswana. Collaboration
with a local organization should be a necessary prerequisite for any
western NGO seeking to hold a meeting in the global south. While this
may seem obvious, discussions with African colleagues suggest that this
approach is regularly not followed by western NGOs, often leading to
southern groups feeling frustrated, marginalized and disrespected in
superficially collaborative initiatives.
38 It should be noted that careful consideration of security was also required within
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The "African Civil Society Consultation on Zimbabwe" was held in
Gaborone on August 5 and 6, 2003. It provided an opportunity for
Zimbabwean human rights and civil society activists to meet with their
counterparts from Botswana, South Africa, Kenya, Namibia, Zambia, and
Malawi to exchange information, ideas, experience, and strategies. The
consultation was the first time that such a broad range of regional civil
society groups had met to focus entirely on the crisis in Zimbabwe, as well
as to think together about methods to individually and jointly address that
crisis.39 It provided an opportunity for the Zimbabwean participants to
give details about the current situation in Zimbabwe and to counter the
tremendous amount of misinformation that exists in the region concerning
Zimbabwe. Such a sharing of information was extremely useful for the
non-Zimbabwean groups represented, as the details provided by the
Zimbabwean participants gave them the necessary tools to engage in
advocacy on Zimbabwe upon their return to their home countries. For the
Zimbabweans, the consultation was an important occasion to meet their
regional counterparts, to learn from their experiences and to share ideas, all
of which provided them with crucial support and encouragement for their
ongoing struggle.
The substantive discussions began with a keynote address by Rev. Pius
Ncube, the Archbishop of Bulawayo and one of Zimbabwe's best known
and respected human rights advocates. Thereafter, presentations were
given by other Zimbabwean participants on three broad themes: political
violence; restrictions upon human rights defenders; and economic and
social rights. These topics were then discussed in detail by all of the
participants, who divided into three break-out groups. Each break-out
group was charged with sharing ideas and formulating strategies to
address the various issues raised. In addition, the participants discussed
regional and international advocacy mechanisms that could be utilized by
civil society groups to bring pressure for an end to ongoing human rights
violations in Zimbabwe. This fourth discussion topic was considered
particularly useful by many of the participants, who had not had previous
experience in accessing and utilizing these mechanisms.
At the close of the consultation, the participants adopted by consensus
a concluding statement, as a public advocacy document.40 In addition, an
internal document was created that laid out a program for action by
African civil society groups on the Zimbabwean crisis, and each of the
39 While individual organizations in several African countries, including South Africa,
Botswana, and Namibia, had been raising concerns about the situation in Zimbabwe for some
time, and such concerns had been expressed at regional meetings such as the African
Commission on Human Rights, there had not yet been a regional meeting devoted to
discussion of Zimbabwe involving such diverse groups from so many different countries. In
addition, coordination of advocacy on human rights in Zimbabwe at a national level had not
occurred in any African country apart from South Africa. There, a Zimbabwe Advocacy
Campaign was created in 2003 to coordinate activities among a range of civil society groups.
40 AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY CONSULTATION ON ZIMBABWE, CONCLUDING STATEMENT (Aug.
6, 2003), at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/hrd zimbabwe/African-Civil-
Society-Consultation.pdf. The full text is available as the appendix to this article.
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participants committed to taking specific steps to pursue this program. The
concluding statement included a strong expression of condemnation,
directed primarily at the Zimbabwean government and its agents. The
participants recognized that the current situation in Zimbabwe constitutes
"a human rights and humanitarian crisis" and demanded an immediate
end to all human rights violations. Tackling the question of land reform,
they emphasized the need for a non-partisan and equitable system of land
redistribution, taking into account the rights of landless peasants and farm
workers. They also stressed that supplies of food aid should be delivered to
the population in a non-partisan manner. The participants then set out
specific demands addressed at regional governments and institutions, as
well as the international community. In particular, they focused on the
African Union, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights,
the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the
commonwealth, and the United Nations.
After the consultation, the organizers and participants distributed the
concluding statement widely, both within Zimbabwe and to all of the
governments and institutions mentioned in the document itself. Upon
returning to their own countries, participants also engaged in local media
outreach in order to encourage greater media coverage within Africa of the
reality of the crisis in Zimbabwe. The statement was also used strategically,
interjected at appropriate moments such as the meeting of SADC heads of
state in late August 2003, and of the commonwealth foreign ministers in
September. This approach was intended to ensure that the voices of
African civil society groups were at least raised during discussions
traditionally restricted to government leaders. In addition, subsequent
statements were issued by the consultation participants as a group at
strategic moments, in order to demonstrate their ongoing solidarity and
commitment to ending the human rights crisis in Zimbabwe.41
All of the participants in the consultation recognized the importance of
developing regional civil society networks with a view to pressuring
regional governments to address the human rights crisis in Zimbabwe,
and, indeed, in other parts of the region. There was also a clear recognition
that advocacy from such networks could help to counter the efforts of
President Mugabe and his supporters to construct and maintain their
facade of being engaged in an anti-colonial struggle. A recent increase in
initiatives by Zimbabwean civil society groups to foster such networks is
indeed evident. For example, shortly after the consultation in Botswana, a
group of Zimbabwean women traveled to South Africa to speak out about
their experiences of rape and sexual violence at the hands of Zanu-PF
agents and supporters. In another initiative around the same time, groups
41 For example, the participants issued an End of Year Statement in December 2003,
reiterating their concerns and particularly addressing developments in the commonwealth
and SADC. The statement can be found at AFRICAN CML SOCIETY CONSULTATION ON
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met in Johannesburg to discuss torture and political violence in Zimbabwe,
and to focus on questions of accountability and impunity.
However, it should also be noted that keeping momentum going after
a meeting, such as the consultation, can be difficult and requires sustained
effort. Particularly where different groups are drawn from broad sectors of
civil society and from a range of countries, it is hard to sustain attention on
an issue. Many of the non-Zimbabwean groups that attended the
consultation are already overstretched dealing with issues in their own
countries that form their primary mandates. There is therefore a problem of
capacity and resources for such external groups to engage in ongoing
advocacy. Thus, it falls to the conveners of a meeting such as the
consultation to act as an ongoing resource and instigator of regional
initiatives. This is not ideal where the convenor is a western-based
international NGO, and it would be preferable to ensure that adequately
resourced regional networks are in place that are in a position to take on
this role.
VII. CONCLUSION
In cases of apparently intractable crisis, it is often difficult to measure
the effectiveness of any particular advocacy approach or strategy. Where
the signs of positive change are faint and shifting, it becomes tempting to
despair of human rights as a concept and a tool wielding any real power.
However, history has shown that the language of rights and the legal
mechanisms that have been constructed to ensure their protection can be
used effectively by those suffering under a repressive regime. For this to
happen, the voices of such people need to be heard both at home and
abroad.
Civil society actors have become a powerful force in many countries,
providing an alternative voice for the people and challenging their
governments and state institutions. Such actors become stronger as they
learn from one another and from their counterparts in other countries and
regions. Recognizing the challenge presented by strong civil society
groups, undemocratic and abusive governments seek to destroy or
diminish them and to prevent their interaction with the outside world. In
those privileged countries where civil society organizations can operate
free of such restrictions, and where there are more readily available
resources for their work, it is incumbent upon such organizations to
support and assist their colleagues elsewhere. Taking on an organizational
and facilitative role for regional meetings is one way in which support and
assistance can be useful.
With regard to Zimbabwe, the need for authentic partnerships between
international and local groups is particularly pressing given the dynamics
of that situation and the attempts of the government to frame political
debate along racial and neo-colonial lines. The many individuals and
organizations within Zimbabwe who are engaged in the difficult struggle
for basic rights are under constant threat and should be listened to closely
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to ensure that external efforts to assist them are in fact useful and effective.
Closer collaboration with such activists, as well as with their counterparts
in the southern African region, is imperative for western organizations at
this critical stage for Zimbabwe. In a world that is increasingly fractured
and multi-polar at a political level, western NGOs must be willing to
discard old methodologies that saw them leading advocacy efforts in the
global South, rather than working in a collaborative fashion with civil
society from the affected country or region.
Human Rights First learned a great deal from both the advocacy
surrounding the August 2003 African Civil Society Consultation on
Zimbabwe and the substantive discussion itself. In particular it should be
noted that our instinct to organize the event jointly with a local NGO was
even more important, from a strategic perspective, than we had initially
believed. Without the prominent public positioning of DITSHWANELO at
the forefront of the consultation, all of our efforts to ensure a genuinely
consultative process would have been marginalized by sustained
Zimbabwean government attacks painting the consultation as one hosted
by British and U.S. lackeys.
From an inter-NGO perspective the partnership with DITSHWANELO
was also very important. By reaching out and working collaboratively with
DITSHWANELO and the other organizations involved in the consultation,
Human Rights First appropriately created a partnership that set the tone
for the meeting. Ensuring an environment in which all NGOs seek to listen
to and learn from one another, and provide input on areas of their greatest
expertise is ultimately a more effective and sustainable advocacy strategy.
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APPENDIX
CONCLUDING STATEMENT OF THE
AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY CONSULTATION ON ZIMBABWE
August 6, 2003
WE the representatives of the under-mentioned civil society groups from
Zimbabwe, Botswana, South Africa, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia and Namibia,
concerned with the human rights and humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe,
held a Consultative Meeting in Gaborone, Botswana between August 5-6,
2003, organized by DITSHWANELO - the Botswana Centre for Human
Rights, and the US-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, to
consider the human rights and humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe:
RECALLING the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/144 of 9
December 1998 which outlines the Rights and Responsibilities of
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect
Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
NOTING that the manipulation of recent constitutional and electoral
processes in Zimbabwe have exacerbated divisions and polarization
whereby principles of good governance, the rule of law and respect for
human rights have been violated,
STRESSING that the prime responsibility and duty to promote and protect
human rights and fundamental freedoms in Zimbabwe lie with the State,
EMPHASIZING the important role that individuals, civil society
organizations and groups play in the promotion and protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms,
NOTING further that a fact-finding mission of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights visited Zimbabwe in June 2002,
COMMENDING the efforts that have been undertaken by civil society, in
particular the Churches, in trying to resolve the human rights and political
crisis in Zimbabwe,
NOTE with grave concern that:
* Serious violations of internationally recognized human rights
standards are widespread in Zimbabwe and constitute a human
rights and humanitarian crisis;
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" The human rights and humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe is
characterised by, inter alia:
serious food shortages, massive job losses, collapse of public health
delivery services, an increase in the HIV/AIDS pandemic, political
violence, torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, arbitrary
detention, attacks on human rights defenders, systematic violence
against women, forceful indoctrination, repressive legislation,
attacks upon the independence of the judiciary, the politicisation of
state institutions such as the police, denial of freedom of expression
and association, partisan distribution of food aid and the resultant
exodus of Zimbabwean refugees;
" The Government of Zimbabwe is indoctrinating and militarizing the
youth and children in militia camps where they are subjected to
sexual abuse including rape, sodomy and exposure to sexually
transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS, [sic]
" These human rights violations undermine the objectives established
in the Harare Declaration, the African Union Constitutive Act and
the NEPAD framework on democracy, good governance, human
rights and development;
" The perpetrators of human rights violations in Zimbabwe are
overwhelmingly government officials, agents and state-sponsored
militias. While criminal responsibility lies with individual
government officials, agents and militias general responsibility for
these violations lies with the Zimbabwean government;
The human rights and humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe affects the
entire African continent and must be addressed as a matter of
urgency by African states and institutions, with the involvement of
local and regional civil society groups.
THE MEETING RESOLVES AND DEMANDS:
1. THAT the government of Zimbabwe:
" Immediately restores the rule of law and ensures the immediate end
to all human rights violations in the country;
* Holds all perpetrators of serious human rights abuses accountable
for their actions, including being criminally prosecuted where their
actions constitute crimes under domestic and/or international law;
" Distributes food and food aid in a non-partisan and equitable
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* Must ensure the fair, non-partisan and equitable redistribution of
land in a transparent manner. The process must take into account
the rights of the landless peasants, the farm workers and the
nation's food security;
" Invites human rights investigative mechanisms of the United
Nations and the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights to visit the country and investigate human rights violations
falling within their mandate;
" Agrees to subject itself to scrutiny by the NEPAD Peer Review
Mechanism;
" Immediately ratifies the Convention Against Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its
optional protocol, and incorporate its provisions into domestic
legislation;
" Repeals all repressive legislation such as the Public Order and
Security Act, the Access to Information and Privacy Act and the
Broad Casting Services Act.
2. THAT East and Southern African governments must strongly
condemn the human rights violations in Zimbabwe and must work
individually and collectively to bring an end to these violations.
3. THAT Countries in the region party to the Convention Against
Torture investigate and prosecute all individuals responsible for
torture in Zimbabwe who come within their territory.
4. THAT SADC should examine the compliance of the Zimbabwe
authorities with the provisions of the Windhoek Declaration, condemn
the human rights violations and exert pressure on the government to
take specific measures to remedy the situation.
5. THAT the President of the AU Commission should issue a public
statement condemning the human rights violations in Zimbabwe and
request the Conflict Management Division to immediately carry out a
proactive fact finding mission to Zimbabwe. The Division should
recommend immediate steps to be taken by the AU and the
Zimbabwean government to prevent a possible violent confrontation.
6. THAT Zimbabwe's suspension from the Commonwealth should
continue until its government complies with the Harare Declaration
and takes concrete steps to restore the rule of law, restores respect for
human rights and holds perpetrators of human rights violations
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accountable.
7. THAT the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
should make its report on the fact finding mission public at its next
session in October 2003. The Commission should then consider its
mission report together with submissions of civil society organisations
and decide in line with Article 58 of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights that a situation of serious and massive violations
of human rights exists in Zimbabwe and brings this to the attention of
the Chairperson of the African Union and further, make
recommendations on immediate steps to be taken by the Zimbabwean
government to end the human rights violations.
8. THAT the member states of the Non-Aligned Movement should
jointly condemn human rights violations in Zimbabwe and work
individually and collectively to bring an end to these violations.
9. THAT the Special Rapporteurs on torture, independence of the
judiciary, freedom of expression, the right to food and violence against
women and the UN Secretary General's Special Representative on
Human Rights Defenders should urgently request permission from the
government to visit Zimbabwe to examine the human rights crisis.
Should this request be denied or ignored, the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights should issue a public statement denouncing human
rights violations in Zimbabwe, as reported to him by local and
international human rights organisations.
10. THAT the situation in Zimbabwe constitutes a threat to regional
peace and security and consideration should be given either by the
Secretary General of the UN or member states of the SADC, EAC and
the AU to place the question of the crisis in Zimbabwe before the UN
Security Council under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.
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